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Abstract
The capacity of agents to act rationally, that is to
make choices that positively reflect their interests, is a
core assumption underlying democratic governance systems, microeconomics, decision science, market driven
economies, and many agent based modeling efforts. In
this paper we investigate axiomatic theories of rational choice from the perspective of computability. Using
algorithmic complexity, we show highly general conditions under which no effective procedure can exist enabling these theories to identify sequences of choices as
random. While axiomatic theories of rational choice
yield powerful descriptions of choice behavior, this
power comes at the expense of axioms which can be brittle with regard to computability limits.

1. Introduction
To say of someone that they are rational is to describe them in a particular way and it is reasonable to ask
what are the consequences of such a description. The
purpose of this paper is to explore this question from
the perspective of computability. Whether or not humans are subject to fundamental computational limits, it
is our argument that scientific theories of agents as rational choosers depend on an assumption that people can be
usefully described as entities whose choices are calculated and thus subject to computational constraints. Rational choice assumptions are common in areas including decision science, microeconomics, voting behavior,
and agent-based modeling.
Within the axiomatic or formal theory of rationality
tradition1 there is a broadly shared sense that rationality
1 Here we refer to theories of rationality which state explicit axioms
about rational choice and use these to derive statements about what we
should expect from agents whose behaviors satisfy those axioms.
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requires some sort of positive responsiveness between
underlying preferences and visible choices [1]. When
offered a pair of items from which to make a choice, a
rational agent will choose the one she most prefers from
the two.
A basic intuition is that a choice by a rational agent
is a choice that can be made sense of by knowing the
agent’s underlying preferences. However, it is precisely
these underlying preferences which we, as external observers, generally cannot directly measure. We must
infer them from choices we can observe. Any particular axiomatic theory of rational choice will then tell
us something about what to expect about choice behaviors given inferred information about underlying preferences. A theory of rational choice should provide informative predictions regarding a rational agent’s choice
behavior.
The literature contains many examples of rigorously formulated rational choice theories. With a notable exception being those influenced by Herbert Simon
[2], these rarely address issues of a person’s actual capacity to make choices in accord with the theory. While
they identify formal conditions under which a rational
choice can exist, they do not provide rules for actually
computing that choice [3].
A key insight of Simon’s was that complexity can
affect a person’s choice behavior and sometimes preclude making a globally best choice. In selecting a life
partner there are billions of possible alternatives from
which to select. However, a person will have relevant information about only a subset of these. Additionally, the
final choice may be influenced by prior considerations of
alternatives. The result is a satisficing or good enough
selection exemplifying Simon’s notion of bounded rationality.
Simon emphasizes processing limitations on human
choices resulting from complex information environ-
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ments such as where the number of alternatives is large.
As further developed by Selten [4], this fundamentally
involves empirical questions. In contrast, following [5]–
[8] we aim to identify basic computability constraints on
assessing the rationality of choices.
We proceed by noting that axiomatic theories can
be understood or interpreted as computer programs, or
equivalently as Turing machines. These theories are intended to produce (permit derivations of) descriptions
that are informative with regard to rational choice behavior. We should be able to provide a formal theory of rationality some input, say preferences and a
set of alternatives from which a choice is to be made,
and have the theory produce as output descriptions of
the choice an agent satisfying the axioms of the theory
would make.
Moreover, not just any such theory would do. A theory which takes as input the choices made by an agent
and then reproduces as output descriptions of those
choices would add no new information. We expect rational choice axioms together with a set of inference rules
to offer a compressed account of patterns of choice behavior in a manner analogous to how a PNG image together with an appropriate decompression program provides a compressed description of a photograph. This
expectation is grounded on the intuition that an agent’s
choices, if rational, should exhibit some sort of patterning. That is, they should not be algorithmically random.
The particular patterning will depend upon the axioms
of the theory being used. Using algorithmic complexity we show general conditions under which no effective procedure can exist to enable these theories to identify sequences of choices as maximally random. While
axiomatic theories of rational choice yield powerful descriptions of choice behavior, this power comes at the
expense of axioms which can be brittle with regard to
computability limits.

2. Axiomatic Theories of Rationality and
Computability
Theories of rationality discussed here are those consisting of axioms which, together with fairly basic arithmetic and logic operators, permit derivation of statements describing observable patterns of behavior by a
rational chooser. We abbreviate class of these axiomatic
theories of rational choice as AT RC. While there are

a variety of axiom sets within AT RC, at core they involve describing what happens when a rational chooser
is faced with a number of options from which some sort
of choice is to be made. We will assume the consistency
of theories within AT RC.
Our interest is in the axiomatic structure of the class
of formal theories of rational choice once computability
condition is required. These theories typically begin by
positing the existence of a set of alternatives, X, from
which an agent is to make a choice. A preference relation is a binary relation on the Cartesian product of the
alternative set, X × X. Typical conditions are those of
the strict preference relation, P defined to be:
i Irreflexive: ∀x ∈ X, ¬(xPx),
ii Asymmetric: ∀x, y ∈ X, ¬(xPy ∧ yPx),
iii Transitive: ∀x, y, z ∈ X, xPy ∧ yPz =⇒ xPz, and
iv Complete: ∀x, y ∈ X, xPy ∨ yPx ∨ y = x.
P then yields a strict total order on X.
Some axiomatic theories of rationality consider the
choice process as deterministic while others see it as
probabilistic. Then there are theories of individual
choice behavior [9] and those that focus on the behaviors
of groups or aggregates. In this paper we consider theories of single-agent rationality where rational choices
are assumed to flow in a positive fashion from underlying preferences. Our interest is in the relation between
preferences and choices and we will not be concerned
with numeric representations of preferences via utility
functions 2
Our example formalization of choice is patterned
after the fundamental work of Uzawa [11], Arrow [12],
and Richter [13] but most other formalizations should
work as well. We begin with an agent faced with making a choice. The objective is to establish conditions
for deciding whether or not the agent’s choice behavior
can be described as rational. Consider a choice space
< X, B > where X represents a nonempty set of alternatives possibly available for choice and B is comprised of
nonempty subsets of X where each B ∈ B corresponds
to a set of alternatives actually available for choice on a
given occasion.3

2 For

utility representations see [3], [10].
theories require X to be finite and others assume it is denumerably infinite or even uncountably infinite (e.g., [13, p. 635] considers the case where X is represented by the “nonnegative orthant of
the n-fold Cartesian product of the real line”). We require X to be
countable.
3 Some

Page 1416

Computational complexity issues arise depending
upon, for instance, whether B is assumed to include
all nonempty subsets of X. In such a case, B would
grow exponentially with the size of X according to
the formula 2n − 1 where n is the number of alternatives in X. For n = 3, the size of B would be only
seven. However, if there are 20 alternatives, B grows
to 1, 048, 575.
In an economics context, a B might be the various
bundles of goods affordable given a budget. In a voting context, a B might be a particular ballot consisting
of names of candidates from which to choose. We shall
refer to the pair < X B > as a ballot space with the understanding that the particular interpretation will depend
upon the contents of X. So if X consists of candidates
for office, B would be subsets of candidates and a particular element of B would describe a possible ballot. A
choice function is a function h which for every B ∈ B
yields a nonempty subset h(B) ⊆ B representing the selection or choice made from each B in B[13].
Our focus is on preference-based individual choice
and we define a strict preference binary relation P on X
as above such that P is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and total.4 The intended interpretation here is that
P is a preference relation such that for any (xi , x j ) where
i 6= j in X either (xi Px j ) or x j Pxi . If xi Px j we say xi
preferred to x j .
Since P is a total and transitive binary relation,
choices may reveal information about preferences even
though those preferences are not directly observable.
An agent can be described as choosing rationally if,
given a set of alternatives, the choice is the P greatest
one. Formally, a P greatest choice is one which can be
described by a choice function h defined on B such
that:
∀B ∈ B, h(B) = x∗ : x∗ ∈ B ∧ ∀(xi 6= x∗ ) ∈
B, x∗ Pxi .
This account of a best choice tells us that to describe
an agent as choosing rationally is to say that the choice
can be described by an h that rationalizes it. But how are
we to know whether an agent’s choice is, in empirical
fact, rational? One approach would be to first suppose
a person to be rational and then note that each time a
4 The reason for requiring X to be denumerable is now apparent. If
X were uncountably infinite as with the real line, then how could we
define an effective procedure for determining for every distinct pair in
X whether or not it was in P? [8] provides an extended discussion of
this.

person chooses an alternative from a B she does reveal
something about her preferences. Imagine we observe a
person’s choice behaviors over the full range of Bs while
keeping h fixed. If a chooser selects alternative xi from
a B when, say, x j and xk are also in B we can say that
xi has been revealed as being preferred to both x j and
xk . This then leads to identifying a rational agent as one
whose observable choice behavior satisfies the principle
that for every possible B in B her choice consists of the
P greatest alternative.
A concrete example, though tedious, will clarify the
preceding discussion and help set up what follows. Consider a case in which there are three brands of toothpaste being considered for purchase–A IM, BABOOL,
and C REST represented using the first letter of their
name: X = {a, b, c}. The maximal size of any B is 2n −
1 (the total number of possible subsets of a set with n distinct elements is 2n and from that we subtract 1 since the
definition of B stipulates that it contains only nonempty
subsets) yielding, in this instance 7. So the largest possible 
B would consist of all nonempty subsets of X or
B = {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c} .
Suppose a person’s preferences happen to order the possiblepurchases alphabetically:
P = (a, b), (a, c), (b, c) . P is irreflexive, asymmetric,
transitive, and total. If the person chooses rationally
we would expect her choice function to look as follows: h({a}) → a, h({b}) → b, h({c}) → c, h({a, b}) →
a, h({a, c}) → a, h({b, c}) → b, and h({a, b, c}) → a. It
is straightforward to verify that the preferences revealed
by these choices do indeed rationalize the choices indicated by h.
This example can be modified to construct an example of an irrational choice. Consider a function h∗ everywhere identical to h above except that h∗ ({b, c}) → c.
It is simple to verify that there is no total, transitive and
strongly reflexive P∗ that could rationalize those choices
and thus an agent whose choices were those of h∗ would
be not be describable as making everywhere rational
choices. This demonstrates the logical possibility of an
irrational choice.
The logical possibility of a person making an irrational choice suggests that rationality is an assumption
and not merely a tautology asserting anything a person
chooses to be rational by virtue of its having been chosen when some other alternative could have been selected. This is significant as rationality arguments are
often criticized as shape shifting when shown that an
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agent’s choices deviate from what a particular rational
choice theory predicts. A response to the faulty prediction might be that, in this particular context, P ought really be thought of as probabilistic relation and we should
be speaking of, say, the probability that a person will select chicken over beef when at a restaurant rather than
requiring a deterministic chicken preference over beef.
In this paper we will sidestep debates as to precisely
which axioms are best suited to describing rationality
and focus on computational constraints relevant to the
class of axiomatic rational choice arguments.
A common thread in AT RC is that a person’s
choices are not random but rather reveal something
about the structure and, perhaps, content of their underlying preferences at the time of their choice. Additionally, the context or environment in which a choice
is made may matter. For example, in a context of
risk, probabilistic assumptions about P may make sense.
While in determining how to fill out election ballots,
viewing P as deterministic may be compelling.5 In other
words, if we consider a person’s choice behavior over
time it is reasonable to think that a person may deploy
different procedures for making choices depending upon
conditions at the time.
Therefore to determine whether a person’s choices
can be said to be rational in both a single choice situation and when looking at that person’s choices over time
we must go beyond asking whether a particular choice is
rational and decide whether the choices a person makes
tend to positively reflect their preferences. Here we recognize that a choice which is rational under one set of
AT RC assumptions might appear not so under a different set. Further, there is the possibility that, on occasion, a person, from her own perspective, errs in making
a choice. A particular choice may result from intending to do one thing yet actually doing another (as in intending to vote for candidate A but mistakenly pulling
the lever for candidate B) or from doing what we intended but having that doing’ incorrectly recorded (as in
properly casting a ballot for A on a flawed voting machine).
As a person lives her life, she makes a sequence of
choices, {c1 , c2 , . . . , cn }. A person can be described as
rational if that string of choices tends to positively re5 A claim that different contexts require different axioms may be
seen begging the question unless accompanied by guidance as to how
an agent should rationally determine which axioms to use when. But
then must not that guidance also be justified? And so on.

flect her underlying preferences. For that to be the case,
it should be her choices exhibit patterning suggesting
they can be rationalized by some, though not necessarily everywhere the same, choice function. By patterned
here we mean that the relation between preferences and
choices is not random. Equivalently, knowing a person’s preferences over time should enable us to make
better than chance predictions about her choice behavior.
When being rational, a person acts with intention.
She intends her choices to positively reflect her preferences. Second, as with most intentions, they can be
overridden by circumstance and for that reason we cannot anticipate every ci for a rational person to be rationalized by her preferences. For example, it is not uncommon to make a purchasing decision and later, upon
reflection, conclude that our preferences would have led
us to a different choice.
We take as a given that to model a person’s choices
computationally is to assume that an agent can be simulated, to any desired precision, by a mechanism that
computes. By computation we mean a discrete state
mechanism of unbounded size capable of reading from a
tape, writing on that tape, and executing loops and conditional branches. Such a machine, a Turing machine
(TM), defines the class of recursively enumerable languages about which anything can be computed. To say
that a function is computable is equivalent to saying the
function can be executed on a suitable coded TM. This is
the Church-Turing thesis and it is from this perspective
that we investigate consequences of modeling rationality computationally; that is simulating rational choice
as calculations made by an appropriately programmed
Turing machine. We assume what Aaronson’s terms the
physical Church-Turing thesis that any device that exists in the physical world, if it behaves in a predictable
way at all, can be simulated, given input data by a TM
machine to any desired precision [14].
TMs are quite general and a given TM can be encoded and simulated on another TM. With suitable encoding, data and programs become interchangeable. By
convention the encoding will be in terms of bit strings,
strings of 0s and 1s. Any particular program can be
encoded without loss as a string of bits as can numbers, photographs, or this paper. This permits reasoning about what is and is not computable and, given
the Church-Turing thesis, what we can computationally
simulate.
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Of particular interest is the fact that any given TM
can be uniquely described by the binary string that defines it. This gives rise to the notion of a universal Turing
machine which takes the binary string description of any
particular TM together with binary string input for that
TM and then computes the same output string as would
the TM. An example of this sort of thing is provided by
programs emulating Windows machines under the MacOS operating system enabling using programs (that is,
strings of bits) originally compiled for Windows under
MacOS (another string of bits). Programs and data can
each be encoded as binary strings.
Computability immediately imposes conditions
that, while perhaps initially unfamiliar, are quite compatible with our desire to focus on what a chooser could,
from a logical perspective, possibly do. In particular,
there are problems which are known to be not computable. A well known example is the halting problem. Turing proved [15] that in general determining
in advance from the description of a computer program
whether that program will finish running (halts) or run
forever is not a computable problem. There can be no
effective procedure for taking any string of bits representing a computer program and deciding whether that
program will halt or run forever.6 Beyond this, it is also
known that there are classes of problems with solutions
that are computable but nonetheless are practically intractable in the sense of taking a very long time to actually compute the results.
Our interest is in the computability of rational
choices. This requires that alternatives not be represented by real numbers as the set of real numbers is
uncountably infinite. Indeed, the computable reals, a
subset of the real numbers, do not form a computable
field as no effective equality relation can be defined as
was proven by Rice [16]. This has particular importance given our focus on rationality, and provides a formal reason we focus on the strict preference relation, P
[7].
We will now use this to identify a computational
limitation to testing for rationality. Imagine we had a
Laplacian Demon [17] able to calculate a person’s preferences and choices. This would mean Demon could
also identify which choices positively reflected preferences and thus were rational in the sense we have been

discussing. Demon will have to compute answers to
counterfactual questions of the sort “what would the person prefer if presented with the set {xi , x j }?” for all
distinct pairs in the alternative set in order to calculate
P.
Here a strictly rational chooser would be expected
to choose the most preferred of the two alternatives for
that would positively reflect the preference for that pair.7
However, as noted above, even a rational person may on
occasion make mistakes or there may be exogenous circumstances affecting a choice. Demon, of course, can
identify these choice “deviations” and properly categorize them as not rational without regard to the cause or
reason.
Demon encodes a rational choice over a pair with
a 1 and a choice that is not rational with a 0. A person’s possible choices over pairs in the alternative set
could then be encoded as a string of 1s and 0s. So, for
example, if Demon looked at a person making choices
over a three alternative set as in the AXP, BA, and
CAG example it would calculate what the person would
do
 over each of the three possible paired comparisons,
{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c} . If the person chose rationally in
every instance we would have the string “111”. Or if the
person made a non rational choice over the third pair,
the string might be “110”.
As the number of alternatives increases, the length
of the bit string increases as well. Suppose there are ten
brands of toothpaste under active consideration for purchase. The number of distinct pairs with ten alternatives
is 45 and the number of unique bit strings of length 45
is 245 or 35, 184, 372, 088, 832. A fairly large number.
A recent check on Wikipedia indicated about there were
about 50 brands of toothpaste. Here the number of distinct pairs is 1, 225 and the number of unique bit strings
is ∼ 5.8 × 10368 . Compare this the estimated number of
atoms in the universe, ∼ 1080 .
This poses no particular computation problem to either the chooser or Demon as the number of paired comparisons to be made for small n alternative sets is modest and there do exist time efficient algorithms for doing paired comparisons. However, issues do arise when
we consider the possibility of deviations in choices over
paired comparisons. Even for a person intending to
make rational choices over all the pairs, mistakes or er-

6 Of course, such a decision can be made for some programs. For
there to be an effective procedure, it must yield a yes/no decision for
all of the countable set of computer programs.

7 Of course what that choice would be expected to be would depend
upon the particular AT RC.
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rors, might occur. Consequently, rather than Demon calculating a bit string of all 1s, “1, 1, 1, . . . 1, 1”, for a person intending to be rational, the actual calculated string
may look like “1, 0, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 1, 0”. Suppose then that
Demon provides us the bit string and invites us to decide whether it encodes the choices of a rational chooser.
Here we do have to confront the combinatorial explosion
of possible bit strings.
A way to proceed would be to note that a string
from a rational agent, even one who makes many mistakes, will not be random and should exhibit some patterning. This can be used to compress the string without
loss of information in much the same way the bit string
describing pixels of a photograph can be compressed. A
discrepancy-free rational person’s string would simply
be a string of 1s as long as the number of choices. On
the other hand, if a person’s choices are fully non rational, we would expect no structure as the person would
be simply selecting alternatives with no intent beyond
making a selection. This is not to say the chooser has no
preferences, only that the choices made were not driven
by them. Demon, as stipulated, calculates preferences
and can accurately predict choices so can readily categorize a given choice as 1 or 0. Since paired comparisons are binary choices and we are assuming people
have preferences, there is always the possibility that acting without intention, that is ignoring preferences, will
still produce a rational selection.
However, we do not have a probability distribution
of choice strings from which we are sampling. We have
only the single string.
Classical probability theory provides guides for calculating the likelihood of particular outcomes given that
those outcomes are generated by a stochastic process
with known, or assumed to be known, properties. This is
not helpful in our case as we have a single binary string
and no particular warrant for assuming the existence of
an underlying generating distribution.
This leads to looking at a given string in terms of its
algorithmic complexity [18]. The basic idea is that some
long strings can be described by simple algorithms. For
example, we might be interested in the string representing the first trillion digits of π. A relatively short computer program can compute these digits and the same
program is also be capable of computing only the first
million digits of π. Moreover, that program would be
considerably shorter than the string of digits it was computing. In this sense, the first trillion digits of π is highly

compressible; it can be described by a much shorter
string (the computer program that computes it plus overhead to generate that string).
Our interest is in a binary string provided by Demon describing a sequence of choices. Each such string
uniquely describes a sequence of binary choices under
the encoding outlined above. For sake of discussion,
suppose we have some particular AT RC and we accept
that the theory is both consistent and sound.
Let’s further assume that our AT RC contains
enough arithmetic to do simple operations. Given a binary string describing choices, s, we can conceptualize
the algorithmic complexity of s, K(s), as the size of
the smallest string consistent with our AT RC that, together with an appropriate input, permits us to compute
s.
There will always exist at least one string which is
maximally incompressible. As a matter of notation, let
|s| denotes the length of string s. The number of programs (strings) shorter than length |s| is at most 2|s| − 1
while the number of strings of size |s| is 2|s| . In other
words, there must be at least one string which cannot be
described by a string shorter than itself for every value
of |s|. Interestingly, as the length of a string gets large,
say greater than around 1000, the vast majority of strings
of that length will be maximally incompressible. These
strings can be considered random in that they exhibit no
pattern that can be exploited to compress them. An algorithm for generating such strings can do no better than to
simply list the string. RANDOM (the set of all random
bit strings) and INCOMPRESSIBLE (the set of all incompressible bit strings) are equivalent for the processes
we are examining.
However, can even Demon decide for all bit strings
whether it is an element of INCOMPESSIBLE? Is there
an effective procedure which Demon can use to establish for any given string whether it is maximally incompressible? Such a procedure would be of more than
purely theoretical interest.8 A person whose choices
are described by an algorithmically random (maximally
incompressible) string of 0s (not rational) and 1s (rational) should most certainly fail a test for being rational.
To illustrate compressibility, Figure 1 shows results
of simulating the choice bit strings Demon might cal8 Indeed, the existence of such a procedure would imply a solution
to the halting problem!
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culate for agents selecting a toothpaste from 50 available brands. In order to arrive at an agent’s total order,
Demon would compute preferences and choices over
1, 225 distinct pairs. As above, there are then 21225 or ∼
5.8 × 10368 distinct bit strings which could possibly result from a given agent’s choices. Generating this number of strings is well beyond the capacity of the computer we are using so our simulation generates, with replacement, pseudo-random samples of the strings. The
bit string for a person whose preferences formed a total order over the 50 brands and who unerringly chose
positively with regard to those preferences would be a
string of 1, 225 1s. The plot in 1 shows the results
for different likelihoods of discrepancies from making
rational choices for 1000 agents for discrepancy likelihoods ranging from 0 to 1 in .1 increments. This was
done 1225 times for each of the 1000 agents being simulated at each likelihood of deviating from a rational
choice.9
The plot shows average byte size for compressed
choice bit strings at each discrepancy likelihood level.
Strings were compressed using Mathematica’s built in
lossless compression algorithm, COMPRESS[19]. The
fences around each mean denote the maximum and minimum compressed byte sizes at each likelihood level. As
expected, mean deviation likelihoods from 0 (no deviations) to .5 (random choosing) monotonically increase
and beginning at .1, there is overlap between the maximum compressed size at one level and the minimum
compressed size at at the next level.
Byte size is an imperfect proxy for string size as
the specific byte count will depend upon the compression algorithm used as well as specifics of how data are
stored on a particular machine. Once compressed, a
1225 length bit string of all 1s describing each choice
as rational is reduced to 64 bytes. To that must be
added a constant, c, reflecting the size of the compression/decompression code. That program code can
be thought of as a string of bits encoding the patterns
looked for by the particular compression algorithm.
Similarly, particular AT RC sentences can be expressed
as a string of bits which, among other things, can be
used to predict patterns in choice data. Those predictive
9 These

1000 choice bit strings are an exceedingly small sample of
the ∼ 5.8 × 10368 set of all possible bit strings of length 1225. The
proportion is so close to 0 that attempting to display it as an approximate real number signals a “too small to represent as a normalized
machine number” warning on our machine.

Figure 1: Mean Byte Size for 50 Alternatives as
Function of n

sentences will also have a constant bit size the value of
which, c, will depend upon the precise encoding used.
In the example of Figure 1, the size of the compression
code, c, is the same for each choice bit string so we can
look at the relative compressibility of the strings without knowing the value of c.10 The importance of c will
become more apparent below.
As discrepancy likelihoods go from .5 to 1 (always
deviate from a rational choice), we see a mirror image of
what happened between 0 and .5. Interestingly these are
data Demon will have since, by assumption, Demon has
perfect knowledge of both preferences and choices. As
mere human observers without direct access to preference information, an agent with a deviation likelihood of
1 would look to us like a rational chooser whose preferences are revealed as reversed from what Demon knows
them to be. From Demon’s perspective agents whose
likelihood of deviating from a rational choice are greater
than .5 would appear as perverse choosers in that their
preferences inform their choices though in a negative
way.11 The irrational agents would be those choosing
randomly. They are irrational in that there is no informative relation between their preferences and their choices.
Knowing with certainty a random chooser’s preferences
provides no advantage in predicting his choices.
Figure 1 is intended to illustrate the relation pattern
between the compressibility of a choice string and the
propensity of an agent to exhibit discrepancies between
preferences and choices. The specific amount of com10 The

source code for COMPRESS has not been made available
though it appears to be based on Zlib[20].
11 Oddly enough, reversibility of preferences does not always work
as expected. [21] shows that reversibility has unexpected consequences with an AT RC based upon Luces’s choice axiom.
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pression we can get for a given bit string will depend in
part upon the specific compression algorithm used. A
particular compression algorithm gives an initial upper
bound estimate regarding how much a bit string can be
compressed. There may well be another algorithm, perhaps yet to be discovered, that will do better. Put differently, if the AT RC we are using fails to see compressible
patterns in the choice bit string, perhaps another, more
complex, AT RC would reveal those patterns. All this
must be understood knowing that that for long bit strings
the vast majority will not be compressible.
There is an important sense in which Figure 1 is
misleading as it displays choice bit strings generated
from known probability distributions. The assumption
of stochastic randomness, that is that each choice bit
string at each discrepancy level are independent and
identically distributed, is not compatible with the individual choice problem as we have described it. Demon
calculates a choice bit string only using knowledge of
an agent’s preferences and choices. There is no known
underlying distribution of deviations for any particular
agent and no expectation that any two agents would deviate from rationality in accord with a common random
process. For a given agent, Demon mechanically calculates a single choice bit string of finite length and must
then decide whether that string is patterned or if it is random. Demon is in the domain of algorithmic randomness and must first decide whether the single calculated
choice bit string is random and thus describes choices
from an irrational chooser. Equivalently, Demon has to
decide whether the bit string is compressible.
A theorem due to Chaitin [22] proves there can be
no effective procedure for deciding that any given bit
string is maximally incompressible. Given a formal system, T (and recall that any AT RC theory would be such a
T ), then there is a number c, depending upon T such that
there is no effective procedure derivable from T that can
decide whether the statement asserting “K(s), the complexity of string s, is greater than c” is true. What is
surprising is that we know such complex strings must
exist by the simple counting argument above. Indeed, as
the length of strings gets long, the vast majority will be
incompressible. Thus there exist statements of the form
“the complexity of string s is greater than c” that are undecidable in T . Even Demon, assuming it to be a Turing
compatible entity, will not be able to decide whether every string of choices is irrational, in the sense of bein
complex g random and thus incompressible, under a

given AT RC. Importantly, even if we attempt to augment a particular AT RC with additional assumptions, as
long as the resulting theory continues to be consistent
and sound, the result will continue to hold though perhaps with a different value of c. Put differently, no matter how many axioms we add or refine, there will continue to exist choice bit strings which we can not prove
to be irrational; that is, random.
In Chaitin’s colorful words introducing his theorem, “. . . if one has ten pounds of axioms and a
twenty-pound theorem, then that theorem cannot be
derived from those axioms” [23, p. 942]. The theorem can be proved by first assuming that membership in INCOMPRESSIBLE is decidable by a Turing machine M. Since INCOMPRESSIBLE was produced by M its elements are denumerable and can be
ordered lexicographically. We can then construct another Turing machine, M ∗ that takes as input a decimal
number, n, and looks sequentially through elements of
INCOMPRESSIBLE and returns sn , the lexicographically first bit string in INCOMPRESSIBLE, which is of
length n. The binary representation of the decimal number n will be ≈ log2 (n) bits long. That is, sn , an element
of INCOMPRESSIBLE, is uniquely described by the bit
string made up of the code for M ∗ followed by the binary
representation of n or sn ≡ {hM ∗ ihni}.
We also know that since sn produced by M ∗ in an
n-bit string element of INCOMPRESSIBLE, K(sn ) ≥
n. The length of sn ≡ {hM ∗ ihni} which describes sn is
equal to the length of M ∗ which is a constant, c once M ∗
is fixed plus the length of the binary string encoding n,
log2 (n).
Taken together, this yields: n ≤ log2 (n) + c. This
inequality cannot be true any sufficiently large value of
c. Therefor we conclude that Turing machine M cannot
exist and membership in the set INCOMPRESSIBLE is
undecidable. In turn this means RANDOM is also undecidable.
The impossibility of an effective procedure does not
mean that it is never possible to decide whether a finite length choice bit string is random. In fact, for certain choice strings such as those containing only 1s, this
will be straightforward. Also, for choice strings that are
short relative to a given AT RC, proper determinations
may be possible. The impossibility of an effective procedure means that there can be no decision algorithm
derivable from any AT RC which is guaranteed to work
for any choice bit string it encounters. Demon will, in

Page 1422

general, be unable to decide whether a choice bit string
came from an irrational agent.

3. Conclusion
We argue that for a person to be described as rational does not mean that all her choices are rational.
Mistakes, for example, are possible. Rather, rationality
requires at minimum that one’s choices not be random.
In this paper, we show that even for a Turing compatible Demon with full knowledge of an agent’s preferences and choices, it will be undecidable whether or not
any given sequence of that agent’s choices is random in
the algorithmic complexity sense of being incompressible. This result reflects the challenges of conceptualizing rational choice while respecting computability constraints. As has been pointed out by others [3], [6],
[8], [21], [24], much extant rational choice theory has
been developed using the mathematics of real analysis
with little concern for whether the underlying alternative sets and choice functions were computable under
the Church-Turing thesis.
While this result suggests that we will not have axiomatic theory capable of deciding the rationality of all
possible strings of choices, it also illustrates that considering the compressibility of these strings will provide
upper bounds on their algorithmic complexity. Those
bounds can improve as new theories identify patterns
not derivable from previous ones. Compressibility measures, as defined within particular theories, offer computable metrics for assessing relative rationality even
as the Kolmogorov complexity of a string is not computable.
Rational choice theorists generally use classical
stochastic models in reasoning about uncertainty in the
decision process. While often appropriate, they can be
misleading when there is no estimable underlying distribution from which observed data were drawn. In such
cases, algorithmic randomness, as discussed in this paper, becomes significant.
Public policy problems have been analyzed representing preferences with real valued utility functions and
using real analysis to identify optimal policies. Alternatives are modeled as an uncountably infinite set of
real numbers most of which are not computable. If utility functions are restricted to computable reals, many
optimality arguments, which depend upon topological

fixed point theorems, break down [6], [8]. As the number of alternatives grows, axiom sets would have to be
ever more complex if they are to be of use in deciding whether choice strings are non-random in situations
where each choice string is sui generis.
It is not an adequate defense to argue that axiomatic
rational choice theories merely posit that agents behave “as if” they could make these calculations and it
thus is not important to know whether they actually do.
This would have us focus only on predictions and not
worry about the underlying mechanisms required for the
theory to make those predictions. However, it is precisely those mechanisms that are significant in addressing counterfactual questions arising in debates over best
decisions.
On the one hand, axiomatic theories of rational
choice yield powerful descriptions of choice behavior.
On the other, this power comes at the expense of axioms
which can be brittle with regard to computational limits. The kind of conclusion reached in this paper is not
unusal as impossibility and undecidability results have
become standard fare post Gödel [25] and Turing [15].
As an increasing number of decision support models become implemented on digital computers, it is important
to scrutinize underlying assumptions of computability.
We suggest the challenge is to develop theories of human decision-making and rational choice which have
computability built firmly into their axiomatic foundations.
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